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Rethinking Althusser’s Meta-Marxism 
Abstract 
 
Can Althusser’s original 1965 project of reinterpreting Marx still inspire new 
developments in Marxist theory? The present paper aims to answer this question 
in the affirmative. Focusing on the meta-Marxist framework set up in Pour Marx, 
and notably on the distinction between science and ideology, it argues that even if 
it may not be possible to uphold this framework, its very collapse points beyond 
the limitations of the Marxist tradition. It does, in fact, point towards a more 
dynamic Marxism, emphasising its practical political aspect and claiming that it 
is necessarily an open theory. Furthermore, the paper stresses the continuity 
between Althusser’s original project and such a development of Marxist theory. 
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Rethinking Althusser’s Meta-Marxism 
 
 
I. Introduction 
In philosophical debates, Althusser’s Marxism has suffered quite a strange fate.
1 
In particular his paper on ideology as interpellation
2 
has proved extremely 
influential, inspiring such writers as Judith Butler
3 
and Slavoj Žižek.
4 
In contrast, 
his attempt to offer a stringent reconstruction of Marx’s problematic, a project 
presented primarily in Lire le Capital and Pour Marx,
5 
has been more or less 
abandoned. 
Admittedly, some of the key concepts of these works inspired Ernesto Laclau 
and Chantal Mouffe,
6 
but Lire le Capital and Pour Marx also provoked significant 
criticism.
7 
In time, the critics came to include some of Althusser’s former 
students.
8 
And even Althusser himself seems to have eventually abandoned his 
original project. This is expressed, among other places, in his 1978 ‘Lettre à  
Merab’, where he states  that 
 
”Je vois clair comme le jour que ce que j’ai fait voilà quinze ans, c’a été 
de fabriquer une petite justification bien française, dans un bon petit 
rationalisme nourri de quelque  références  (…) à  la prétention du 
marxisme   (le 
1 
For an account of Althusser’s influence in literary studies see e.g. Montag 2003 and Ferretter 2006. 
2 
Althusser 1976, pp. 67-125. 
3 
Butler 1997. 
4 
Žižek 2008. 
5 
Althusser 1996a and 1996b. 
6  
Laclau and Mouffe 2001, pp. 97-8. 
7  
E.g. Avenas et al. 1999. 
8  
Rancière 1975. 
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matérialisme historique) à se donner comme science. Ce qui est 
finalement (était, car depuis j’ai un peu changé) dans la bonne tradition 
de toute entreprise philosophique comme garantie et caution. Je vois 
aussi que, les choses étant alors ce qu’elles étaient, les prétentions et 
contre- prétentions étant alors ce qu’elles étaient, et moi étant ce que 
j’étais, il ne pouvait en aller autrement (…). Les choses sont quand 
même un peu compliquées: et j’ai de surcroît acquis une  autre  
certitude, savoir que  les écrits  se suivent selon une logique qui (…) ne 
se laisse pas ’rectifier’ aussi facilement que cela. Rectifie, rectifie, il en 
restera toujours quelque chose…”
9
 
 
Given this background it is tempting simply to conclude that the project 
formulated in Pour Marx and Lire le Capital has failed.
10 
This paper, however, 
will argue that such a conclusion is premature and that it misses two important 
points. First, what might be perceived as the failure of Althusser’s 1965 project 
specifically is really the failure of a dominant tendency in classical Marxism. By 
presenting us with a reformulation of classical Marxism marked by an 
unparalleled degree of  stringency, Althusser therefore takes us to the limit of this 
tradition. Second, and more importantly, the ‘failure’ of Althusser’s project, rather 
than simply disqualifying it, also opens  a new direction for Marxist theory which, 
I will argue, is still compatible with his 1965 conceptual framework. 
9 
Althusser 1994b, pp. 527-528. 
10 
Hindess 1996. 
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To make these points, the present paper will first identify a fundamental 
difficulty in Althusser’s early Marxism: his inability to maintain the division 
between science and ideology. It will then assess the consequences of this 
difficulty, suggesting that it implies a change in our understanding of the 
relationship between theory and political practice in Marx’s work. Finally, the 
paper will outline the basic principles of a Marxism in line with this new 
understanding, arguing that such an approach can still be understood within a 
general Althusserian conceptual framework. 
 
II. Althusser’s meta-Marxist framework 
Why is Althusser’s 1965 Marxism of particular interest? His ambition in Pour 
Marx and Lire le Capital is not to present yet another interpretation of Marx, but 
to reconstruct his  project
11  
and to purify it of ideological elements. In other words, 
it is Althusser’s ambition to answer the question about what Marxism has to be, if 
it is to be not just another philosophy, but a science   of history.
12 
Even though 
much of classical  Marxism
13  
has  asserted that Marx’s theories are (also) 
scientific, this is a crucial question  which, in  Althusser’s perspective, has  not 
been    raised, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11 
Althusser 1996b, pp. 22-5. 
12 
In what follows, I will not make any sharp distinction between ‘Marx’ and ‘Marxism’. This reflects the view that 
the necessary starting point of Marxist theory is and always has been   the interpretation of Marx, and that any 
attempt to distinguish between Marx and Marxism itself has to rely on just such an interpretation. In other words, 
there is no ‘Marx’ outside Marxism and no ‘Marxism’ that is not (also) an interpretation of Marx. 
13  
E.g. Korsch 2008. 
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let alone answered, by the representatives of classical Marxism themselves.
14
 
Broadly speaking, Althusser’s project therefore contains two  main elements. On 
the one hand we have the elaboration of what could be termed a meta-Marxist 
conceptual framework, defining  for instance the role of science in Marxism. On 
the other hand, we have the reinterpretation of Marx’s understanding of society 
and history as a structured whole of relatively autonomous levels overdetermined 
‘in the last instance’ by the economy. Obviously the two elements are inseparable; 
it is  the  meta-Marxist  definitions of science and ideology that both obligate and 
allow Althusser to specify exactly how Marx’s approach differs from, say, that of 
Hegel. 
Both elements are found in what is arguably a key text in his 1965 works, the 
essay ‘Sur la dialectique matérialiste’ in Pour Marx.
15 
This remarkable text begins 
by drawing the very basic conceptual distinctions necessary for a consistent 
Marxist theory, and goes on to define the concept of overdetermination, a 
centrepiece in Althusser’s reformulation of a non-Hegelian Marxist dialectics. 
Furthermore, the central status of this article is underlined by the fact that its meta-
Marxist distinctions are the main target of Althusser’s later autocriticism.
16
 
 
 
 
 
14 
For a discussion of Althusser’s concept of science, see Althusser 1974b and Bensaïd 1999. In general, it is a 
prevalent view in the Marxist tradition that Marx’s criticism of Smith and Ricardo, while breaking with the 
scientific frame of understanding of classical  economics, is still a scientific criticism, attempting to bring the 
economic sciences beyond their inherent ideological limitations. 
15 
Althusser 1996a, pp. 161-224. 
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It is, therefore, this essay that I will be focusing on in what follows. However, I 
will only be examining what I have termed the text’s meta-Marxist conceptual 
framework. One reason for this is that Althusser’s entire philosophy hinges on the 
consistency of the demarcations made in this context. Another reason is that it is 
within this framework that Althusser attempts to give a stringent definition of the 
basic elements of the Marxist tradition. As pointed out in the introduction, it is the 
hypothesis guiding the following analysis that this definition also makes him reach 
the limit of this tradition. In this context, therefore, his meta- Marxist conceptual 
framework is of particular interest. 
Three concepts make up the basic elements of Marxist theory according to 
Althusser; practical politics, ideology, and Marxist science. These elements, in 
turn, are organised according to a double distinction. 
First and most importantly, Marxism (Communist politics and   its theory) is  
sharply  distinguished  from  ideology understood as ‘le rapport vécu des hommes 
à leur monde’.
17 
As the ‘lived experience’ of people, ideology is different from 
scientific truth. Even though it necessarily presents itself as truth, its  purpose is  
not to make us see the world as it really is, but to integrate people in society.
18 
Marxist science, therefore, constitutes an ‘epistemological break’ with ideology. 
This break is found  in Marx’s own writings in 1845, it is irreversible, and it is 
characterised above all by the abandonment of the idea of ‘alienation’ as the 
source of human misery in    favour of structural 
17 
Althusser 1996a, p. 240. 
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and economic explanations.
19 
In this break, Marx  founded Marxism as the (!) 
science of history. This implies that what defines Marxism as such is Marxist 
science. Therefore there can  be no dialectical exchange between this science and 
its ideological counterpart; on the contrary, while Marxist  science  takes  the  form 
of a critique of ideology, the latter always threatens  to  intrude into, and so to 
destroy, true   Marxism. 
The other side of this double distinction is Althusser’s differentiation of Marxist 
theory from political activity. On the one hand, the practical political struggle is 
not necessarily in need of Marxist theory.
20 
In most instances it does  well  without  
theoretical correctives, and that may be one of the reasons why Althusser has 
strikingly little to say about this practical side of Marxism.
21 
On the other hand, 
practical political struggle sometimes will need theoretical guidance – and this is 
what justifies Marxist theory in the first place. The reason for this need of 
assistance is, of course, the constant threat from ideology. In   the heat of battle it 
may be difficult to distinguish clearly between genuine Marxist viewpoints and 
ideological deviations, and when this is the case, theory should intervene in the 
practical struggles   to guide the  militants.
22
 
Note how Althusser in this manner only differentiates practical politics from 
Marxist theory in order to be able to unite them. Theory needs to be something 
different from the practical  political 
19 
Althusser 1996a, p. 233. 
20 
Althusser 1996a, p. 178. 21 
Another reason may be his loyalty to the party, and his unwillingness at this point in time to provoke 
disagreements with the official party line. 
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struggles if it is to be able to intervene in these struggles and to correct ideological 
mistakes. Note also how this is not just one more distinction supplementing the 
one between Marxism and ideology. It is in fact yet another formulation of this 
very distinction. Left to their own devices, Communist militants will eventually 
fall prey to ideological patterns of thought. The differentiation of Marxist science 
from political struggle is therefore also a distinction between Marxism and 
ideology. 
This is where it becomes clear why Althusser was accused of the ideological 
‘deviation’ known as ‘theoreticism’.
23 
For in itself, the political struggles of the 
militants can be both ideological and Marxist; only the interference of theory 
ensures that they stay within the Marxist camp. What defines Marxism, therefore, 
is not practical Communist struggle, but Marxist scientific theory. Althusser tries 
to compensate for this emphasis on theory by underlining that Marxist science 
itself must be understood as practical – as ‘pratique théorique’. Yet, this defence 
is decidedly weakened by his further distinction, within the domain of theory, 
between science proper and Marxist philosophy which he characterises as ‘théorie 
de la pratique théorique’.
24 
Here, at least, we seem quite far away from practical 
politics.
25
 
All the elements in the double distinction undergo significant changes as 
Althusser develops his theory in the  late sixties. This  is particularly clear when 
it comes to the concept of ideology. As stated above, ideology in Pour Marx refers 
to ‘experience’. It is, in 
23 
Althusser 1973, p. 55. 
24 
Althusser 1996a, p. 172. 
25  
This has lead some commentators to talk of ‘philosophism’ rather than ‘theoreticism’ as the fundamental 
problem in Althusser’s position; see Read & Rodríguez 2008. 
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other words, described as a mental phenomenon. This is fairly close to Marx’s 
own use of the concept. However, Althusser later, and in particular in Marx dans 
ses limites
26
, comes to criticise Marx for exactly this understanding of ideology. 
Instead, he develops a new position presented primarily in ‘Idéologie et appareils  
idéologiques d’Etat’, written in 1969-1970.
27 
Here, the practical or ‘material’  
aspect of ideology is emphasised.
28 
Ideology is primarily what we do rather than 
what we think. More specifically it is the practices defining the so-called 
ideological state apparatuses, the function of which is to interpellate individuals 
as subjects. While Althusser supplements rather than discards his previous 
formulation about ideology as experience, the theory about ideological state 
apparatuses obviously marks a decisive development in his understanding of this 
concept. 
Althusser also further develops his concept of science. This is seen very clearly 
in Philosophie et philosophie spontanée des savants from 1967. Here scientific 
practice is no longer intrinsically free from ideology. On the contrary, Althusser 
identifies what he calls a ‘spontaneous philosophy’ in the sciences, and this 
philosophy has both a materialistic and an idealistic element.
29 
Ideology, here in 
the form of idealism, exploits the sciences, while materialism reflects the actual 
scientific practice. Of these two tendencies, idealism is dominant, 
 
 
 
26 
Althusser 1994b, p. 496. 
27 
This paper was extracted from the more extensive manuscript published posthumously as 
Sur la reproduction in 1994. See Althusser    1994c. 
28 
Althusser 1976, p. 105. 
29 
Althusser 1974b, p. 100. 
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but the role of Marxist philosophy is to intervene in the scientists’ spontaneous 
philosophy to strengthen its material element.
30
 
Finally, in Eléments d’autocritique and Réponse à John Lewis,
31 
Althusser alters 
his view of the role of philosophy in Marxism. It  is no longer understood as 
metatheory, but as ‘class struggle in theory’.
32 
This development, already under 
way in Philosophie et philosophie spontanée des savants and in ‘Lénine et la 
philosophie’
33 
from 1968, is his explicit attempt to correct the theoreticism 
mentioned above. While the original definition of philosophy as ‘théorie de la 
pratique théorique’ made the epistemological break appear to be an entirely 
theoretical event,  the substitution of truth for error, Althusser now emphasises 
that philosophy is political. More accurately, philosophy stands  between the 
sciences and practical politics, functioning both as theoretical intervention in 
politics and as political intervention in the sciences (as seen above, the latter 
intervention can be either materialistic or idealistic). 
The common denominator of these developments in the late sixties is, therefore, 
Althusser’s increasing focus on  practice  as the defining aspect of Marxist theory. 
Science is understood as a practice, philosophy as politics, and ideology as 
practices  – and    as the production of practical effects in the sciences. This 
development, culminating in the redefinition of philosophy as ‘class struggle in 
theory’, may be seen as a continuous effort by 
 
 
30 
ibid. pps. 107-113. 
31 
Althusser 1973 and 1974. 
32 
Althusser 1973, p. 56. 
33 
Althusser 1998, pps. 103-144 
10
Décalages, Vol. 2 [2016], Iss. 1, Art. 25
https://scholar.oxy.edu/decalages/vol2/iss1/25
11 
 
 
Althusser to rid his theory of ideological remnants in general, and of 
theoreticism in particular. 
The double distinction outlined above is specified in just a few short texts, 
notably in Pour Marx. And as has just been demonstrated, Althusser’s position 
develops considerably after Pour Marx. Why, then, is it justified to assign to this 
distinction such decisive importance? There are three main reasons for this. First 
of all, whatever the changes made by Althusser in his subsequent writings, the 
double distinction stays essentially unchanged (at least until the late seventies). 
Even though the idea of practice comes to play an increasingly important role in 
his understanding of both science and ideology, and even though it can be argued 
that the contradistinction between science and ideology is less pronounced in his 
later works, Althusser never renounces his central idea of an epistemological 
break as constitutive of the difference between the two.
34 
It is symptomatic in this 
regard that Philosophie et philosophie spontanée des savants deals with the 
sciences in general, and the humanities in particular, but not, at least not explicitly, 
with Marxism as a science. Nor does Althusser abandon the idea that Marxism 
has to be theory. More precisely, it has to be defined by the interplay between 
theoretical and political practice. As outlined above, Althusser in time comes to 
stress the dialectical nature of this interplay, but he does not question the 
distinction between theoretical and political practice which is, on the contrary, the 
necessary precondition for this interplay. As philosophy’s political 
 
34  
This point is also made by Lewis   (2005). 
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aspect is emphasised, the theoretical side of Marxism increasingly comes to be 
identified with Marxist science. This is seen, among other places, in Althusser’s 
new understanding of epistemology   no longer as ‘théorie de la pratique 
théorique’, i.e. as philosophy, but as a part of the scientific practice  itself.
35
 
The second reason for assigning such decisive importance to the double 
distinction is that it defines what can be recognised in Althusser’s other writings 
as the programme of his Marxism: To specify in what sense Marx’s work (and 
Marxism in general) breaks with ideology. This is his aim not just in his 1965 
works but also in his later writings. Finally, the third reason for assigning such 
great importance to the double distinction is the fact that its collapse is what 
ultimately brings Althusser’s Marxism to disintegrate. 
 
III. The breakdown of the double distinction 
As previously mentioned, Althusser’s 1965 project was on the receiving end of 
severe criticism. His insistence on the epistemological break was, among other 
things, seen as an attempt to rid Marxist theory of its dialectic dimension,
36 
and so 
was his attempt to dissociate Marx from Hegel.
37 
Furthermore, critics never ceased 
to point out instances of (in Althusser’s view) ideological reasoning in Marx’s 
mature work, thus questioning the validity of his idea of an epistemological 
break.
38 
And finally, theory was seen as dominating the practical side of Marxism   
in 
35 
Althusser 1974, pps. 51-52. 
36 
Brohm 1999. 
37 
Althusser 1996a, p. 27. 
38 
Avenas and Brossat 1999. 
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Althusser’s account of it, hence the aforementioned charge of ‘theoreticism’
39 
and 
Althusser’s efforts to revise his theory. A common feature of all the criticism cited 
above is, of course, that   it refers to the double distinction in his  work. 
Most of this criticism, although serious, is not fatal to Althusser’s project. For 
instance, what is particularly damaging to the double distinction is neither the 
occasional appearance of ideological concepts, nor Marx’s favourable statements 
about Hegel. After all, Althusser’s aim was to reconstruct Marx’s problematic 
under the assumption that it was incompletely conceived by Marx himself. 
However, even if one does not agree with the critics, it is fair to say that the double 
distinction ultimately collapses. What causes its collapse is the fact that ideology 
seems to be an essential part of the distinction itself. 
As outlined above, Althusser himself soon admitted that his meta-Marxist 
framework suffered from theoreticism, making this admission the starting point 
of his process of autocriticism. However, his new understanding of philosophy as 
‘class struggle in theory’ (rather than ‘théorie de la pratique théorique’) in no way 
manages to fend off the charge of theoreticism, since the basic distinction between 
politics and theoretical  practice  remains.  Even in his modified framework, theory 
needs to be something different from the political struggle if both elements are to 
be Marxist at all. And this differentiation is exactly what is targeted  by the charge 
of theoreticism. Ideology, in other words, seems to 
 
 
 
39 
Brohm 1999. 
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be a central element of the very meta-Marxist structure designed to keep 
ideology out of Marxism. 
The distinction between Marxism and ideology is not, of course, a unique feature 
of Althusser’s philosophy. On the contrary, it is a necessary element of a Marxist 
tradition claiming scientific validity for Marx’s theories. This claim is found not 
just in Marxist mainstream orthodoxy,
40
 but also in early alternatives to this 
orthodoxy such as Korsch and the young Lukács.
41
 What  is  unique for Althusser, 
in this respect, is not just his far  more  refined concepts of science and ideology, 
but also his insistence   on the double character of the distinction between the two. 
What much of the tradition failed to recognize, or at least to make explicit, is that 
for Marxist theory to be something qualitatively different from ideology, it also 
has to be qualitatively different from the day to day political struggles where all 
the cats are  grey. 
The necessity of the double distinction is illustrated by a comparison with 
Lukács’ position in History and Class Consciousness. Lukács explicitly insists on 
the identity of politics and theory, as well as on the party as their unification. 
According  to his view of the party, ”Its closely-knit organisation with its resulting 
iron discipline and its demand for total  commitment  tears away the reified veils 
that cloud the consciousness of the individual in capitalist society.”
42 
It is, in other 
words, the party organisation itself as such which operates  the  break  with  
ideology. 
 
40 
Kautsky 1988 41 
Korsch 2008 and Lukács 1990. 42 
Lukács 1990, p. 339. 
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If this view is unacceptable from an  Althusserian perspective,  it  has to do not 
only with the problematic political and theoretical implications of postulating the 
party’s infallibility. His insistence on the double distinction also mirrors the  
historical  circumstances and experiences expressed in his work, specifically the 
Twentieth Party Congress  and  the  ensuing  criticism of Stalin and  his 
“personality cult” referred to explicitly in Pour Marx. For this was nothing if not 
an illustration of the fact that the party was not infallible. Unlike Lukács, Althusser 
in his reformulation of Marxist theory must therefore operate on the  assumption 
that,   as a matter of historical experience, Communist political practice (Lukács’ 
‘party’) is not simply Marxist theory incarnate. And this is why he clearly sees 
(again, unlike Lukács) that for Marxist theory to actually matter, for theory to 
make a political difference, it has to be separated from practical politics as a matter 
of  principle. In other words, if Marxist theory is to safeguard  the party against 
new ideological deviations, it has to be something different from the day to day 
dealings of the very same party. 
If the double distinction is what makes Althusser’s Marxism untenable, it 
therefore also disqualifies the Marxist  tradition.  Even if this tradition, as in the 
case of Lukács, has not  always  seen the need to supplement its distinction 
between Marxism and ideology with a corresponding distinction between Marxist 
theory and practical politics, Althusser makes a compelling  point  that such a 
distinction is needed. And if the collapse of the tradition becomes visible in 
Althusser’s project rather than  in  other  versions  of  Marxism,  it  is  only  because  
his  is  a more rigorous 
15
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account, drawing the full consequences of what it means for Marxism to be 
different from ideology. 
This is also why it is not an option to save Althusser’s differentiation between 
science and ideology (and with that differentiation the Marxist tradition) by giving 
up the other side of the double distinction, even though this would appease the 
critics of Althusser’s theoreticism. In fact, this is as far as the traditional criticism 
typically goes, denouncing one side of his double distinction without reflecting on 
its connection to the question of Marxism and ideology. 
A close examination of Althusser’s readings of Marx and Hegel confirms that 
this solution must be rejected. It confirms, in other words, the necessity of the 
differentiation of science from practical politics. For what characterises the 
ideological elements in Marx’s writings that Althusser tries to get rid of in his 
reconstruction of Marxism? The answer is: They are political. In the Marxist 
tradition these elements appear as didactic, polemical and simplifying 
presentations that for reasons of immediate political  use distort the rigor and 
consistency of Marxist theory. This is   seen not just in Althusser’s criticism of 
Marx and Lenin
43
, but   also in his agreement with them. And it is seen not just in 
Pour Marx, but also in his later writings. To mention just one example, Althusser, 
with Lenin, disqualifies ‘spontanéisme’ as “une  idéologie politique qui, sous le 
couvert d’une exaltation verbale de la  spontanéité  des  masses,  l’exploite  pour  
l’engager  dans    une 
 
 
 
43 
Althusser 1996a, pp. 103-4, 113, 177, 204-5, 243. 
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politique fausse.”
44 
As is clearly stated here, it is under the cover of rhetoric 
(‘exaltation verbale’) that  ideology  (‘spontanéisme’) finds its way into and 
destroys Communist political  practice. 
This is why Althusser’s basic operation has to be not just a simple, but a double 
distinction: There is no exclusion of ideology from Marxist theory unless these 
political uses of theory are also excluded from theory proper. In other words, the 
ideological elements take the shape of rhetoric, polemics, and simplification 
because they serve specific political purposes in the practical struggles. They are 
part of a political practice which uses theoretical elements but which is not  based  
on  theoretical insights. Althusser therefore seems to be spot on when he insists 
that the distinction between the two fields of practice is necessary for Marxism to 
establish itself as different from ideology; only this distinction, as we have seen, 
seems impossible to   maintain. 
Now Althusser has nothing against the use of rhetoric, didactics, and 
simplification as such – for the very reason that they may be politically useful. 
But as he says in the very last sentence of Pour Marx, ‘Nous devons prendre garde 
qu’en ce processus aucun mot, justifié par sa fonction pratique, n’usurpe de 
fonction théorique : mais qu’en s’acquittant de sa fonction pratique il disparaisse 
en même temps du champ de la théorie’.
45 
In other words, the ideological 
statements are empty words which may work well in politics, but which need to 
literally disappear from the domain of theory where it is determined ‘what 
Marxism really is’. While ‘words’ may serve a political function, only ‘concepts’ 
have a   place 
44 
Althusser 1998, p. 125. 
45 
Althusser 1996a, p. 258. 
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in theory. The basic difficulty for Marxist theory, therefore, is to keep (empty) 
words and (theoretical) concepts apart. 
From the point of view of theory, the problem with the political- ideological 
statements is not merely that they are false. They are actually uncontrollable by 
any theory, true or false. On the one hand, ideological statements are, admittedly, 
at the root of such deviations from ‘true’ Marxism as economism and humanism. 
Ideology, in other words, is hypertheoretical, as it can be used to legitimise any 
misreading of Marx. But on the other hand it is also nontheortical, as the many 
different ideological statements cannot be fitted into one coherent theory. 
What Althusser’s analysis amounts to, therefore, is that unguided practical 
politics finds theoretical expression not just as ideology, but also and more 
importantly as theoretical undecidability. Or to put the same point slightly 
differently: Politics is the source of the differences between Marxism and 
ideology, and therefore politics itself is undecidable in terms of the distinction that 
Althusser’s entire work is an attempt to uphold. Politics, therefore, should never 
be ‘in itself’, it should always be sanctioned by, or at least in accordance with, 
Marxist science. If the purely political elements of Marx’s work are included in 
Marxist theory, this theory will no longer be able to differentiate itself from 
ideology, and that would mean the end of Althusser’s project. Or to use yet a third 
formulation: Practical politics reveals itself in Althusser’s analysis as the openness 
or  the inconclusiveness of theory – and so of the distinction between Marxism 
and ideology. 
18
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One may actually interpret Althusser’s theoretical development, especially after 
1970, as driven by the constant attempt to uphold   a double distinction threatened 
by the constant emergence of political-ideological thought patterns in what was 
believed to be  the core texts of Marxist theory. The problem of theoreticism is 
just the more obvious proof of the futility of this endeavour. Arguably, it finds an 
even more dramatic expression in Marx dans ses limites
46 
which appears rather  as  
the  deconstruction  of Marxist tradition than its development. It may seem,  
therefore,  that the more Althusser tries to present a rigorous account of Marxism, 
the more it becomes apparent that it cannot be purified  of its ideological elements. 
The more thorough the purge of ideology, the more it seems to appear everywhere: 
“Rectifie, rectifie, il en restera toujours quelque chose…” 
To merely state that Althusser’s Marxism has failed is to focus   on just one part 
of this double distinction – the impossible differentiation of Marxism from 
ideology. On the other hand, to ask how his Marxism, in its very failure, may still 
inspire new attempts to understand Marx and to develop Marxist theory, is to take 
seriously, at the same time, the impossibility  of  the distinction between practical 
politics and theory, and the identification of practical politics and theoretical 
undecidability. What does this impossibility-undecidability tell us, albeit  
indirectly and against Althusser’s own explicit intentions, about Marx’s work and 
so about Marxism? 
 
 
 
46 
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First, it is clear that we are forced to conclude that Marxist theory cannot be what 
Althusser wanted it to be: A coherent and consistent science informing political 
struggles from without. As politics and theory seem inseparable, it may make 
more sense to understand Marxism as a political practice reflecting on itself as 
well as on its immediate historical conditions. 
Second, in my reading of Althusser I argued that Marx’s practical politics found 
expression in Althusser’s theory as hypertheoretical-nontheoretical and so as 
uncontrollable by theory. If practical politics is at the heart of  Marx’s work, and 
so  of the Marxism that he inspired, then the breakdown of Althusser’s double 
distinction challenges us to understand the implications of the necessary presence 
in Marxism of that hypertheoretical-nontheoretical political engagement which is 
the limit of Marxist theory and of political theory in general. In other words, we 
need to understand the dialectical interplay in Marx’s work between theory and 
that which cannot be theorised – his practical political engagement. 
 
IV. Rethinking Marx and  Marxism 
It is, of course, beyond the scope of this paper to present a complete 
reinterpretation of Marx  and Marxism in this light. Yet  in the spirit of Althusser 
I will give an indication of a new meta- Marxist frame of understanding suitable 
for  such  a reinterpretation. 
At least two points need to be made here. First of all, if the differentiation of 
theory  and politics  is  what  leads Althusser into 
20
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theoreticism, a new approach to Marx and Marxism should draw the consequences 
of the inseparability of these two elements. This has many implications, but first 
and most importantly  it means  that the object of Marxist theory has to be the 
political challenges met by Communist  militants. 
In this perspective, Marx’s own work too has to be understood as driven by the 
political project of working class emancipation. This might seem trivial, but in 
fact it is a point of departure which decidedly shifts the emphasis from the 
scientific consistency underlined by Althusser in his 1965 project to the political 
consistency of a programme that is formulated, albeit to begin with very vaguely, 
by Marx already before the epistemological break of 1845. And it implies that it 
is this political programme which defines the elaboration and use of Marxist 
theory. Since the struggle for working class emancipation necessarily takes place 
in constantly shifting circumstances, this approach implies a fundamental 
dialectical tension in Marx’s work which may account for many of its theoretical 
shifts and developments – what may in an Althusserian perspective look rather 
like simple inconsistencies. This is the dialectic between a tactical and a strategic 
perspective. Capital, for instance, is clearly an example of strategic analysis in the 
sense that the infrastructure of capitalist economy is laid bare in order to illuminate 
the permanent and general conditions of working class anti-capitalist struggles. 
On the other hand, Marx’s political analyses – most famously perhaps The 
Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte – exemplify tactical analysis in the sense 
that they try to guide 
21
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working class struggles in complicated circumstances demanding more than a 
simple translation of general theory into specific instances. 
Both strategic and tactical analysis are  political  in  the  sense  that they are made 
necessary by a political programme that they relate to in different ways. This is 
true no less of Capital than of The Eighteenth Brumaire – which is also why it is 
unsurprising  that later studies have emphasised  the  intrinsically  political  nature 
of Capital
47
. All elements of Marx’s oeuvre can, in other words, serve a political 
purpose. Actually, looking over just some the more important titles in his work 
allows us to distinguish between at least six different, but interrelated political 
functions. The Communist Manifesto, for instance, is clearly an example of 
propaganda, while Capital, as already mentioned, provides the strategic 
foundation for the workers’ movement. In The German Ideology and The Misery 
of Philosophy Marx and Engels develop their own theoretical and political 
position in polemical  criticism of other left wing theorists of the day, while 
Criticism of the Gotha Programme constitutes their direct intervention into the  
debates   of the German Social Democratic Party. Salary, Price, Profits is the 
manuscript of a lecture given by Marx before the  general  assembly of the 
International workers’ association, and The Civil War in France is a report to the 
leadership of this same organisation about the political turmoil in France in   1871. 
The point is not, of course, that each work serves one and only one  function.  
Nor  is  it  to  insist  that  Marx’s  texts  fulfil     only 
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political functions – or, for that matter, that the political functions of his work give 
us an exhaustive list of what political practice can be. Obviously, practical politics 
is so much more than what can be found in books. The point, however, is that the 
political is omnipresent in Marx’s work. There is no ‘theoretical practice’ which 
is not also inherently political, and this also implies that theory as such can never 
be the stringent and consistent  monolith envisioned by Althusser. 
This leads us to the second point to be made here. For if practical politics is at 
the heart of Marx’s work, and if practical politics is, as Althusser’s reading of 
Marx has demonstrated, hypertheoretical-nontheoretical, then Marxist theory 
always carries with it, because of this political element (and so because of its 
necessary tie to the passing circumstances defining the immediate political tasks, 
possibilities, and limitations), that which cannot be theorised, but marks the limit 
of all theory – and which finds theoretical expression as the non-theoretical, e.g. 
as didactics, polemic, simplification... In other words, because of its political 
element, Marxism is always overdetermined by politics in a manner which is 
beyond the control of Marxist theory. It is a theory in but not of the political. 
A famous illustration is Marx’s Critique of the Gotha Programme. Marx refrains 
from making his critique public, as the new party based on this programme, much 
to his own surprise, becomes a political success. And he thereby implicitly accepts 
that the theoretical integrity of Marxism is compromised for political reasons. In 
this context too, therefore, ideology is politics   without 
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theoretical backing, and its theoretical expression is the impossibility of a 
stringent Marxist position. It is unsurprising, therefore, that Althusser in Marx 
dans ses limites, cites the Critique as a particularly frustrating example of what he 
refers to as the “absolute limits” of Marx’s theory
48
. 
Furthermore, it is also in  this  light  that  one  must  understand the different 
views about the distinction between politics and theory. This is obviously more 
than just a  theoretical  disagreement. The insistence on the unity of politics and 
theory found not just in Lukács, as cited above, but also e.g. in Korsch
49
, is 
overdetermined by the political need to counter Social Democratic revisionism. 
As previously mentioned, Althusser’s position, on the other hand, is 
overdetermined by the criticism of Stalinism. But it also reflects another direct 
political concern, as the insistence on the difference between theoretical and 
political practice is meant to keep the party from interfering in the work of 
Communist intellectuals. Considering  how  prominent  intellectuals risked 
expulsion from the party if their theories were deemed deviant (the best known 
example being, of course, Garaudy), this was a very real concern, and in his later 
years Althusser himself was quite frank about this function  of  his  theory as 
political strategy.
50 
Recent commentaries not only emphasize this function,
51 
but 
also  recall that  several  elements of Althusser’s work caused political controversy    
within 
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the Communist Party, making his concern for the autonomy of theory all the more 
politically important.
52
 
In other words: Whether Marx, Korsch, Lukács, or Althusser, theory is 
overdetermined by a political context, the theoretical expression of which is the 
aporetic inconclusiveness or openness of theory (as seen above where theory both 
has to be and cannot be separated from practical politics). This also implies that 
Marxist theory can never be finished, it can never be perfected in the grammatical 
sense of the word. It is always, in more than one sense, a work in progress, 
necessarily invested in political circumstances that are constantly changing. As 
Althusser’s problems demonstrate, it is this investment that prevents any 
interpretation of Marx to be coherent and consistent. And this has two immediate 
consequences. 
First, it means that we need to reconsider the logic  of  the  concept of ideology 
in Marxist theory. Žižek may find a decisive difference between Althusser’s 1970 
article on ‘ideological state apparatuses’,
53 
where ideology is the  interpellation  of  
subjects, and Lacanian ideology critique where this interpellation is never perfect, 
but always leaves a scar of ‘the Real’.
54 
Yet if we follow the above interpretation, 
it seems not only that we find a similar essential imperfection in Marx and in  
Marxist  theory,  but  also that this imperfection constitutes the dynamic of Marxist 
theory itself. If, in other words, we understand Marxist practical politics  as  that 
which makes  both  science and  ideology at the  same time 
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definable and ungraspable, the distance from Marx  (and  Althusser) to Lacan may 
not be that long after all. The challenge  for a new Marxist ideology critique then 
becomes to reflect on this essential undecidability and to search for it not just in 
Marxist theory, but in theory in  general. 
This is not to deny any distinction between Marxism and  ideology. But this 
distinction has to be understood not as en ‘epistemological’ break establishing 
Marxism as a science once  and for all, clearly differentiated from its 
epistemological and political counterpart. Instead, it must  be  understood  as  a  
practical break, taking place in the political struggles that form Marx’s work. This 
is the reason why it can never be definitive but always ‘leaves a scar’. This is, in 
other words, the reason why we continue to detect ideological elements in Marx 
even in  his  mature work. Marxist theory is developed as the continuing 
confrontation with ideology in and through political practice. 
Second, the above interpretation also implies the task of rethinking the 
relationship between Marx and political philosophy. It may at least be 
hypothesised that one decisive difference between Marx’s theories and those of 
mainstream political philosophy is that while the latter aim for theoretical 
consistency, the purpose of Marx’s theories is to make a practical difference. For 
Marx there is no retreat from the political realities into an original position under 
a veil of ignorance.
55 
His approach is rather the abolition of philosophy’s 
constitutive distance between  the  theoretical  and  the  practical,  a  distance  that  
he 
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explicitly denounces already in The German Ideology.
56 
This denunciation is 
actually the very purpose of his concept of ideology, as it is developed in that very 
text. In other words, by coining his concept of ideology he criticizes philosophy 
for being blind to its own actual political functionality because of this self- 
imposed distance. It is in this sense that there, strictly speaking, can be no ‘Marxist 
philosophy’.
57
 
How does the meta-Marxist framework sketched above relate to current 
discussions about Marx? Even in recent interpretations of his work, politics and 
science remain key concepts. Many theorists still view it as scientific.
58 
Some 
emphasize, e.g., Marx’s enduring epistemological importance for the social 
sciences, while others claim that Marxism should be seen a hermeneutic science.
59 
Still others, like Terrell Carver, argue, to the contrary, that far from being a 
scientist, Marx must be understood as a journalist and a rhetorician, and that he 
can only be portrayed as a theorist if the rhetorical parts of his work are ‘bracketed 
off.’60 Interestingly, this implies the same view of rhetoric as the limit of theory as 
outlined in the above analysis. However, the point made in this paper differs 
decidedly from the one made by Carver, as it does not warrant the conclusion that 
Marx’s work, and Marxism for that matter, is not (also) scientific. As mentioned 
above, a text may fulfil different purposes, being at the same time both scientific 
and political. The point made in this paper is rather that 
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Marxist science, if there is indeed such a thing, can never be a closed, coherent 
and stringent theory, because it is invested in, and so overdetermined by, a 
political context (or to use a classical term, it is ‘revolutionary science’). It can be 
argued, however, that it is exactly openness or imperfection which characterises  
scientific practice as such, i.e. as a process rather than  as  a  system. Therefore, 
while it has not been the purpose of the  present paper to either confirm or deny 
the scientific status of Marx’s work, its conclusions are compatible with seeing 
this work as not only political, but also scientific. 
 
V. Beyond Althusser? 
Is it not the case that one might arrive at this approach to Marx and Marxism in so 
many other ways than by the examination of Althusser’s failing meta-Marxist 
framework? It probably is. Yet it makes sense to emphasize not just the ways in 
which Althusser more than any other facilitates this turn towards the political in 
Marxist theory, but also the degree to which this alternative still has to be 
understood as Althusserian in its fundamental approach. 
To begin with, it is because Althusser more than any other  Marxist philosopher, 
and in such an uncompromising  fashion,  tries to purify Marxist theory of 
ideological (and political) contamination that his failure to do so directly leads to 
the task defined above: the necessity to reflect on the inseparability of theory, 
politics, and ideology in Marx’s work. To do that is simply to reflect on the failings 
of Althusserian Marxism. 
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Yet as stated above, this project is still, for several reasons, kept within a general 
Althusserian frame of understanding. First of all, the fundamental ambition is the 
same, to provide a meta-Marxist framework allowing a consistent interpretation 
of Marx’s work. Admittedly, consistency is no longer sought after in theory, but 
rather in Marx’s political project. Still, however, the aim of achieving (some sort 
of) consistency is the same. As should be clear from the above account of 
Althusser’s 1965 project, this meta- Marxist approach is very Althusserian, and 
therefore not uncontroversial. Yet with the principles of a possible reinterpretation 
of Marx and Marxism outlined above, I hope to have made the case for the value 
of such an approach. 
Second, unlike so many of Althusser’s critics, the present  reading of his 
Marxism and its failings does not seek to challenge his characterisation of Marx’s 
manuscripts prior to 1845 as pre- Marxist (Althusser 1996a: 45-83). On the 
contrary, focusing on the political aspects of Marx’s work actually seems to 
confirm that a decisive break takes place around the time of the editing of The 
German Ideology. What characterises Marx’s writings before this time is 
precisely, among other things, is the absence of the practical political functionality 
that we find in his mature work. Here, on the contrary, ‘philosophy’ is to 
materialize itself in the proletariat,
61 
which is decidedly something quite different 
from putting philosophical reflection at the service of a proletariat struggling to 
liberate itself from the yoke of capital. 
 
 
 
61 
Marx 2006, p. 385. 
29
Beck Holm: Rethinking Althusser’s Meta-Marxism
Published by OxyScholar, 2016
30 
 
 
Furthermore, this new framework maintains the major building blocks of 
Althusser’s collapsed theoretical architecture while slightly rearranging them. 
Reading Marx is still a matter of understanding how theory, politics, and ideology 
play together in his work. Althusser greatly emphasized the importance of political 
practice – to such an extent that it has been said about his philosophy that it 
identifies ‘being’ with ‘struggle’.
62 
Yet according to critics this emphasis was 
rather a rhetorical attempt to cover     up the fact that his structural Marxism left 
very little room for political agency.
63 
In the approach outlined above, Althusser’s 
explicit focus on political agency is given a better theoretical underpinning exactly 
because Marx’s work is now understood as defined and driven by a political 
project. Theory still has a vital role to play, but theory can never be purified from 
ideology precisely because it is political theory, that is because it is motivated by 
and finds its application in the aforementioned political project. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the present project of reinterpretation 
may not have been so strange to Althusser after all. For he himself also developed 
an alternative account of theory and politics.
64 
This account, differing substantially 
from his ‘official’ Marxism, has already previously been described as an attempt 
to conceptualise the unity of theory and practical politics.
65 
Its precise outline, 
however, has only become clear after Althusser’s death, primarily because it is 
presented in  writings 
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that he did not publish himself. It is found, for instance, in Sur la philosophie,
66 
and in his masterpiece Machiavel et nous.
67
 
In these works, Althusser comes to define political practice as the limit to, or the 
‘outside of philosophy’
68 
which exists as  traces in philosophy itself. In 
Machiavelli he sees ‘le premier théoricien de la conjoncture’
69 
exactly because he 
turns upside down the hierarchy of theory and political practice that Althusser 
advocates in his ‘official’ Marxism. Machiavelli is not attempting to make grand 
theory, he is not interested in what is universally    or even generally the case. 
Instead his point of departure is the specific challenges for a political programme 
(the reunification of Italy) under specific historical circumstances, and his 
application and development of theory is dictated by this concern. This produces 
in theory an emptiness and an ambiguity that is both    the void necessary for 
political agency and the theoretical  reflection of that which is beyond the grasp 
of theory as its necessary precondition.
70
 
Interestingly, contrary to what is believed by some commentators,
71 
this 
alternative approach is not a new development in Althusser’s work after 1980. His 
reflections on Machiavelli date back to the early sixties, and the ‘materialist 
undercurrent in philosophy’, an idea so important to his late work,  is  mentioned  
already  in  Lire le Capital.
72  
Furthermore, 
 
66 
Althusser 1994a. 
67 
Althusser 1997, pp. 39-168. 
68 
Althusser 1994a, p. 152. 
69 
Althusser 1997, p. 59. 
70 
Althusser 1997, p. 62. 
71  
See e.g. Raymond 1997, pp. 168-9 and Skordoulis 2008, p.  564. 72 
Althusser 1996b, p. 288. 
31
Beck Holm: Rethinking Althusser’s Meta-Marxism
Published by OxyScholar, 2016
32 
 
 
recently published documents  show  that  another  central category, ‘the 
encounter’, is a theme already in 1966.
73 
It is therefore with good reason that  
recent  studies  have underlined the continuity between Althusser’s earlier work 
and his later ‘materialism of the encounter.’
74
 
Rather than a criticism of Althusser, the programme outlined above can therefore 
be seen as an attempt to think along the line of what might be referred to as a 
‘hidden undercurrent’ in Althusser’s own Marxism, while at the same time 
emphasizing the logical connection between this undercurrent and his original 
1965 programme for Marxist theory 
 
VI. Conclusion 
What does it mean for a philosophical project ‘to fail’? No philosophy remains 
eternally valid and unsurpassed, and that  could never be the goal of Marxist 
philosophy anyway. In agreement with the 11
th 
Thesis on  Feuerbach,  Marxist 
philosophers reflect on current society with the aim of facilitating its change. They 
aim to provoke debate and critical reflection on ideological thought patterns. 
If this is the definition of ‘success’ in Marxist philosophy, Althusser’s 1965 
project can hardly be said to have failed. On the contrary, few works in the Marxist 
tradition have, to the same extent, provoked debate as well as sharpened people’s 
consciousness about the role of ideology in theory and in society. That is also the 
case with his meta-Marxist framework discussed 
73 
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in this paper, even though it only indirectly touches upon the question about how 
to understand current society. After all, in a Marxist perspective, the question 
about how to understand Marx and Marxism properly is also a question about how 
to understand society. 
In this paper I have argued that even if Althusser’s 1965 project  of redefining 
Marxism as a stringent and coherent theory has proved untenable, this in no way 
implies its  uselessness  for  current reflections on how to reinterpret Marx and 
Marxism. On  the contrary, if its problems are due to the fact that Althusser follows 
through the ambitions of scientific status present in classical ‘official’ versions of 
Marxism, his theory itself points beyond its breaking point to new interpretations. 
Stating that the mess of practical politics cannot be filtered out from Marxism as 
a theoretical enterprise in itself implies the task of uncovering the dialectic 
between practical politics and theory in Marx’s work. 
Therefore, I have also argued that one does not need to abandon an Althusserian 
approach to Marxism. Central elements, such as the idea of a decisive break in the 
theoretical development of the young Marx, can be reintegrated into a new meta-
Marxist framework. In other words, it is still possible to be an Althusserian 
Marxist, even if one leaves behind the idea of the double distinction. Althusser 
himself may actually be the best proof of this. With his analyses of Machiavelli 
and the idea of political practice as the uncontrollable outside of theory he himself 
may have paved the way for one last turn in the development of his theory. In 
these analyses he therefore not only 
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in theory insists that political philosophy must always contain an openness, an 
inconclusiveness that is the possibility of political agency. His analyses are also, 
practically, to be  understood  as open invitations to carry on the politics of Marxist 
tradition  beyond its theoretical limitations. 
The above analysis obviously does not settle all (if any) questions on how to 
read Marx. In particular, it needs to be debated just how his original project of 
working class emancipation (if it is, as has been argued above, ever present in his 
theoretical work) translates into today’s social, political, and economic context. 
That, however, has not been the topic of this paper. What it has done, on the other 
hand, is to argue why this is a question not just of political, but also theoretical 
importance. For in this perspective, understanding Marx’s theories on their own 
terms also requires one to continuously reinvest them in practical politics. 
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